(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.

(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm, unless:

(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and

(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter.

(c) Except with respect to paragraph (d) below, if a lawyer is personally disqualified from representing a person with interests adverse to a client of a law firm with which the lawyer was formerly associated, other lawyers currently associated in a firm with the personally disqualified lawyer may represent the person, notwithstanding paragraph (a) above, if both the personally disqualified lawyer and the lawyers who will represent the person on behalf of the firm act reasonably to: 

(1) identify that the personally disqualified lawyer is prohibited from participating in the representation of the current client; and 

(2) determine that no lawyer representing the current client has acquired any information from the personally disqualified lawyer that is material to the current matter and is protected by Rule 1.9(c); and 

(3) promptly implement screening procedures to effectively prevent the flow of information about the matter between the personally disqualified lawyer and the other lawyers in the firm; and 

(4) advise the former client in writing of the circumstances that warranted the implementation of the screening procedures required by this Rule and of the actions that have been taken to comply with this Rule.

(d) The procedures set forth in paragraph (c) may not be used to avoid imputed disqualification of the firm, if: 

(1) the lawyer’s representation of the former client was in connection with an adjudicative proceeding that is directly adverse to the interests of a current client of the firm; and 

(2) the proceeding between the firm’s current client and the lawyer’s former client is still pending at the time the lawyer changes firms.

(e) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.

(f) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11.

(g) The rule in paragraph (a) does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary. Nor does paragraph (a) prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from acting because of events before the person became a lawyer, for example, work that the person did as a law student. Such persons, however, shall be screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect.

Background

The Louisiana Supreme Court amended this rule on May 10, 2023. The amendment became effective immediately and has not been amended since. Louisiana Rule 1.10 differs from ABA Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.10 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2023) in several significant respects.

Paragraph (a): The General Imputation Rule and Screening of Lateral Lawyers

This is the most significant area of divergence between the two rules.

Louisiana paragraph (a) states the general imputation rule with a single exception: the prohibition does not apply if it “is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm”. Notably, Louisiana uses the phrase “the prohibited lawyer”. 

ABA paragraph (a) states the same general imputation principle but includes two exceptions rather than one. ABA subparagraph (a)(1) is the personal-interest exception, which is substantively the same as Louisiana’s sole exception, though the ABA version uses the phrase “the disqualified lawyer” instead of “the prohibited lawyer”. ABA subparagraph (a)(2) is a detailed screening mechanism for lateral lawyers moving between private firms, which Louisiana does not include in its paragraph (a) at all. Under ABA (a)(2), a firm may avoid imputation when the prohibition is based on Rule 1.9(a) or (b) and arises out of the disqualified lawyer’s association with a prior firm, provided the disqualified lawyer is timely screened and apportioned no part of the fee from the matter. In addition, written notice must be promptly given to any affected former client, and that notice must include a description of the screening procedures employed, a statement of compliance by the firm and the screened lawyer, a statement that tribunal review may be available, and an agreement by the firm to respond promptly to written inquiries or objections about the screening. The ABA rule further requires that certifications of compliance be provided to the former client at reasonable intervals upon the former client’s written request and upon termination of the screening procedures. 

Louisiana addresses lateral-lawyer screening not in paragraph (a) but in its own paragraphs (c) and (d), which are discussed next.

Louisiana Paragraphs (c) and (d): Louisiana’s Unique Screening Regime

Louisiana paragraphs (c) and (d) have no direct counterpart in the ABA Model Rule. 

Louisiana paragraph (c) permits screening to overcome imputation when a personally disqualified lateral lawyer joins a new firm, but its requirements differ materially from the ABA approach. In terms of what triggers the provision, Louisiana (c) applies when a lawyer is “personally disqualified from representing a person with interests adverse to a client of a law firm with which the lawyer was formerly associated”. The ABA trigger is more specific: the prohibition must be based on Rule 1.9(a) or (b) and must arise out of the disqualified lawyer’s association with a prior firm. 

The substantive requirements also differ in several respects. First, Louisiana (c) does not include a fee restriction—there is no requirement that the screened lawyer be apportioned no part of the fee. The ABA rule expressly requires this. Second, Louisiana (c)(2) requires a preliminary determination that no lawyer at the new firm has acquired any material information from the personally disqualified lawyer that is protected by Rule 1.9(c). The ABA rule contains no analogous pre-screening determination requirement. Third, the notice requirements differ. Louisiana (c)(4) requires written notice to the former client of the circumstances warranting the screening and the actions taken to comply. The ABA rule’s notice provision is considerably more detailed, requiring a description of screening procedures, compliance statements, notice that tribunal review may be available, and an agreement to respond to the former client’s inquiries. Fourth, Louisiana does not require ongoing compliance certifications, whereas the ABA rule requires certifications at reasonable intervals upon the former client’s written request and upon termination of the screening. 

Louisiana paragraph (d) creates a limitation on the availability of screening that has no counterpart whatsoever in the ABA Model Rule. Under Louisiana (d), screening may not be used to avoid imputed disqualification when two conditions are both met: the lawyer’s representation of the former client was in connection with an adjudicative proceeding that is directly adverse to the interests of a current client of the firm, and that proceeding is still pending at the time the lawyer changes firms. The ABA Model Rule contains no similar limitation on screening availability. 

Paragraph (b): Imputation After a Lawyer Departs

Louisiana paragraph (b) and ABA paragraph (b) are substantively identical. Both provide that after a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm, unless the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the departed lawyer represented the client and any remaining lawyer has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter. 

Waiver

Louisiana paragraph (e) and ABA paragraph (c) are substantively identical. Both provide that a disqualification prescribed by the rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 

Government Lawyers Provision

Louisiana paragraph (f) and ABA paragraph (d) are substantively identical. Both provide that the disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11. 

Louisiana Paragraph (g): Nonlawyers and Pre-Admission Work

Louisiana paragraph (g) has no direct counterpart in the black-letter text of the ABA Model Rule. Louisiana elevates to rule text the principle that paragraph (a) does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm when the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary. Nor does it prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from acting because of events before the person became a lawyer—for example, work that the person did as a law student. Louisiana requires that such persons “shall be screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect”. 

In the ABA Model Rules, this same principle appears only in Comment [4] to Rule 1.10, not in the rule text itself. The differences between the two are noteworthy. The ABA Comment uses softer language, stating that such persons “ordinarily must be screened,” while Louisiana’s rule text uses the mandatory “shall be screened”. The ABA Comment also cross-references Rules 1.0(k) and 5.3, which the Louisiana rule text does not. Finally, there is a minor wording difference: Louisiana refers to “work that the person did as a law student,” while the ABA Comment says “work that the person did while a law student”.

Comments to ABA Model Rule 1.10

Definition of “Firm”

[1] For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term “firm” denotes lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization. See Rule 1.0(c). Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend upon the specific facts. See Rule 1.10, Comments [2] – [4].

Principles of Imputed Disqualification

[2] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a)(1) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10(a)(2) and 1.10(b).

[3] The rule in paragraph (a) does not prohibit representation where neither questions of client loyalty nor protection of confidential information are presented. Where one lawyer in a firm could not effectively represent a given client because of strong political beliefs, for example, but that lawyer will do no work on the case and the personal beliefs of the lawyer will not materially limit the representation by others in the firm, the firm should not be disqualified. On the other hand, if an opposing party in a case were owned by a lawyer in the law firm, and others in the firm would be materially limited in pursuing the matter because of loyalty to that lawyer, the personal disqualification of the lawyer would be imputed to all others in the firm.

[4] The rule in paragraph (a) also does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary. Nor does paragraph (a) prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from acting because of events before the person became a lawyer, for example, work that the person did as a law student. Such persons, however, ordinarily must be screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect. See Rules 1.0(k) and 5.3.

[5] Rule 1.10(b) operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).

[6] Rule 1.10(c) removes imputation with the informed consent of the affected client or former client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. The conditions stated in Rule 1.7 require the lawyer to determine that the representation is not prohibited by Rule 1.7(b) and that each affected client or former client has given informed consent to the representation, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the risk may be so severe that the conflict may not be cured by client consent. For a discussion of the effectiveness of client waivers of conflicts that might arise in the future, see Rule 1.7, Comment [22]. For a definition of informed consent, see Rule 1.0(e).

[7] Rule 1.10(a)(2) similarly removes the imputation otherwise required by Rule 1.10(a), but unlike section (c), it does so without requiring that there be informed consent by the former client. Instead, it requires that the procedures laid out in sections (a)(2)(i)-(iii) be followed. A description of effective screening mechanisms appears in Rule 1.0(k). Lawyers should be aware, however, that, even where screening mechanisms have been adopted, tribunals may consider additional factors in ruling upon motions to disqualify a lawyer from pending litigation.

[8] Paragraph (a)(2)(i) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

[9] The notice required by paragraph (a)(2)(ii) generally should include a description of the screened lawyer’s prior representation and be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent. It also should include a statement by the screened lawyer and the firm that the client’s material confidential information has not been disclosed or used in violation of the Rules. The notice is intended to enable the former client to evaluate and comment upon the effectiveness of the screening procedures.

[10] The certifications required by paragraph (a)(2)(iii) give the former client assurance that the client’s material confidential information has not been disclosed or used inappropriately, either prior to timely implementation of a screen or thereafter. If compliance cannot be certified, the certificate must describe the failure to comply.

[11] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, imputation is governed under Rule 1.11(b) and (c), not this Rule. Under Rule 1.11(d), where a lawyer represents the government after having served clients in private practice, nongovernmental employment or in another government agency, former client conflicts are not imputed to government lawyers associated with the individually disqualified lawyer.

[12] Where a lawyer is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions under Rule 1.8, paragraph (k) of that Rule, and not this Rule, determines whether that prohibition also applies to other lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer.

Annotations

Generally

Louisiana Rule 1.10(a) sets forth a simple rule: if one lawyer in the firm has a nonpersonal conflict of interest, that conflict is imputed to all other lawyers in the firm. Thus, if Partner A is currently handling a matter that is directly adverse to a prospective client of Partner Z, then Partner Z may not undertake the representation of that prospective client. Not all conflicts are imputed to other members of a disqualified lawyer’s firm.

Defining “Firm”

Rule 1.10 imputes disqualification to all members of the disqualified lawyer’s “firm.” Rule 1.0(c) uses the term “firm” to denote “a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.” See La. Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.0(c). While the term “firm” has an obvious meaning in the context of traditional law partnerships and law corporations, its meaning in looser associations is less clear. For example, the Restatement suggests that lawyers who “share office facilities without reasonably adequate measures to protect confidential client information” may be considered “affiliated lawyers” for purposes of imputation of conflicts of interest. See Restatement (Third) of the L. Governing Lawyers § 123(3) (Am. L. Inst. 2000).

Indigent defender boards in Louisiana generally are “treated as the equivalent of private law firms.” State v. Brown, 347 So. 3d 745, 839 (La. 2022); State v. Garcia, 108 So. 3d 1, 28 (La. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2863 (2013); State v. Connolly, 930 So. 2d 951, 955 n.1 (La. 2006); State v. Wells, 191 So. 3d 1127, 1144 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2016) (citing State v. Garcia, 108 So. 3d 1, 28 (La. 2012); see also Chester v. Vannoy, No. 16-17754, 2018 WL 2970912, at *7 (E.D. La. June 11, 2018) (citing State v. Garcia, 108 So. 3d 1, 28 (La. 2012)). However, whether conflicts are imputed among independent contractors engaged by an indigent defender board is a question of fact that turns on all of the relevant facts and circumstances. See Garcia, 108 So. 3d at 1.

Interfirm Mobility and Imputed Conflicts

When a new lawyer (“New Lawyer”) joins a firm (“New Firm”), and New Lawyer, while at another firm (“Old Firm”), personally represented a client (“Former Client”), that client–Former Client–is the lawyer’s “former client.” Rule 1.9(a) prohibits the lawyer from undertaking a representation for a new client (“New Client”) that is adverse to Former Client in a substantially-related matter, and Louisiana Rule 1.10(a) imputes this conflict to everyone at New Firm, unless the absurdly narrow exception set forth in Rule 1.10(c)–(d) happens to apply. See La. Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.9(a), 1.10. However, if New Lawyer did not personally represent another client of Old Firm (i.e., that client was represented by another lawyer at Old Firm), that client is not considered to be New Lawyer’s “former client,” and there would be no conflict under Rule 1.9(a). Whether New Lawyer (or any other lawyer at New Firm) can represent New Client against the client of Old Firm turns on whether New Lawyer acquired confidential information that is “material to the matter” while at Old Firm. See La. Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.9(b). If New Lawyer neither represented the client at Old Firm nor acquired confidential information (sometimes called “water-cooler knowledge”) while at Old Firm, New Firm can be adverse to that client. See State v. Craddock, 62 So. 3d 791, 797-98 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2011) (declining to impute a conflict to the public defender’s office where the lawyer had no personal involvement or confidential knowledge relating to the co-defendant); Franklin v. Regions Bank, No. 16-1152, 2018 WL 3212053, at *12 (W.D. La. Apr. 18, 2018); Willis v. TRC Cos., Inc., No. 05-1010, 2006 WL 2803058, at *6 (W.D. La. Sep. 28, 2006).

When a lawyer (“Departing Lawyer”) leaves a firm (“Abandoned Firm”) and takes clients (“Departed Clients”), Abandoned Firm may sue Departed Clients in unrelated matters. Furthermore, Abandoned Firm may sue Departed Clients in substantially related matters as long as no lawyers remaining at Abandoned Firm have confidential information that is “material to the matter.” See La. Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.10(b).

The ABA has issued a formal opinion suggesting that a lawyer may reveal otherwise confidential information to evaluate conflicts associated with interfirm mobility. See ABA Formal Op. 09-455 (Oct. 8, 2009). According to the ABA:

When a lawyer moves between law firms, both the moving lawyer and the prospective new firm have a duty to detect and resolve conflicts of interest. Although Rule 1.6(a) generally protects conflicts information . . . disclosure of conflicts information during the process of lawyers moving between firms is ordinarily permissible, subject to limitations. Any disclosure of conflicts information should be no greater than reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of detecting and resolving conflicts and must not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice a client or former client . . . 

Id.

“Of Counsel” Lawyers

A lawyer who is associated with a law firm in an “Of Counsel” capacity is treated like any other lawyer associated with the firm for purposes of imputation of conflicts of interest. In In re Fuerst, 157 So. 3d 569, 577 (La. 2014), the court stated that “[a] lawyer who is ‘Of Counsel’ to a law firm is considered to be a member of the firm for purposes of analyzing imputed disqualification questions.” Therefore, a lawyer who is loosely associated with a firm in an “Of Counsel” capacity is treated no differently from any other firm lawyer.

Screening to Remove Imputation of Conflicts?

Some jurisdictions, the Restatement, and ABA Model Rule 1.10(a)(2) permit a law firm to avoid imputation of a conflict of interest by screening a disqualified lawyer from the other lawyers in the firm. See Restatement (Third) of the L. Governing Lawyers § 124 (Am. L. Inst. 2000). However, the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct offer screening as a means of avoiding or removing imputation under only narrow circumstances. Screening is permitted, however, in the context of successive government and private employment. See La. Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.11. Before the amendment to the rule in 2023, federal district courts in Louisiana and the Fifth Circuit have refused to allow the use of “Chinese Walls” or “Screens” to avoid imputed disqualification. See, e.g., Green v. Admin. of Tul. Educ. Fund, No. 97-1869, 1998 WL 61041 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 1998). Although one Louisiana appellate court has suggested that a “cone of silence” constructed around a disqualified lawyer may resolve a conflict, see Petrovich v. Petrovich, 556 So. 2d 281, 282 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1990), writs denied, 559 So. 2d 1377 (La. 1990), this opinion is inconsistent with the express language of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and more recent case law. McCann v. ABC Ins. Co., 640 So. 2d 865, 874 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1994) (finding an imputed conflict despite no evidence of the transfer of confidential information); Marks v. Marks, 349 So. 3d 1071 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2022).

Disciplinary Sanctions

For the disciplinary sanctions that are appropriate for a lawyer’s failure to avoid conflicts of interest, see supra Annotations to Louisiana Rule 1.7. State v. Brown, 347 So. 3d 745 (La. 2022) (potential conflicts of interest arising from multiple defendants being represented by the same public defender’s office); United States v. Ryan, No. 20-65 (E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2022) (discussing substantial relationship test and disqualifying lawyer because a relationship existed between lawyer and a cooperating witness whom the firm previously represented).

Notes

This page was last updated September 2026.